There is increasing recognition in philosophical psychology and cognitive science that many of our perceptual and cognitive achievements depend upon couplings between bodily activities and features of the environment. The contributors to this issue of the journal draw on a range of different fields, including phenomenology, cognitive science, analytic philosophy of mind and developmental psychology, so as to make a number of mostly complementary points regarding the situatedness of human experience and thought.

Contents

Introduction
Matthew Ratcliffe and Shaun Gallagher

From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective
Mark Rowlands

Touch and Situatedness
Matthew Ratcliffe

Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem
Michael Wheeler

Are Minimal Representations Still Representations?
Shaun Gallagher

Minimal Representing: A Response to Gallagher
Michael Wheeler

Interpersonally Situated Cognition
R. Peter Hobson

'You' and 'I', 'Here' and 'Now': Spatial and Social Situatedness in Deixis
Beata Stawarska

Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions
Daniel D. Hutto

Farewell to Folk Psychology: A Response to Hutto
Matthew Ratcliffe

The Experiential Workspace and the Limits of Empirical Investigation
Maria L. Talero